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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. The state incorrectly defines battery and misconstrues the force used in this case. 
2. The state fails to adequately answer the question of whether self defense is 
allowed a trespasser facing even reasonable force in ejection. 
1 
ARGUMENT 
1. The state incorrectly defines battery and misconstrues the force used in this case. 
The state on appeal argues to the Court that talcing one by the arm, moving it behind 
them, and forcing them from a room "do not even constitute a technical battery." Respondent's 
Brief at 10. The state does not cite anything for its concept of a "technical battery." The Idaho 
Code describes battery as: 
(a) Willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another; or 
(b) Actual, intentional and unlawful touching or striking of another person against 
the will of the other; or 
(c) Unlawfully and intentionally causing bodily harm to an individual. 
I.C. § 18-903. The state does not explain why the actions it acknowledges Tomasini took do not 
describe a battery, though clearly they involved intent, willfulness, touching, and force. Further, 
they were quite clearly against the will of the defendant. 
The state may be assuming that the word "unlawful" in the statute prevents the actions of 
Tomasini from being a technical battery. However, that is the incorrect definition of"unlawful." 
Though no Idaho Court has ever defined the term "unlawful" in the battery statute, it has been 
defined by various other states in the context of their own battery statutes. The Washington 
Court of Appeals for example found: 
Defendant's argument mistakenly assumes that an assault must be an attempt to 
injure. An assault is an attempt to commit a battery, which is an unlawful 
touching; a touching may be unlawful because it was neither legally consented to 
nor otherwise privileged, and was either harmful or offensive. 
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State v. Garcia, 579 P.2d 1034, 1036 (1978) citing R. Perkins, Criminal Law, ch. 2, s 2.A.1, at 
107-08 (2d ed. 1969); 6 Am.Jur.2d, Assault and Battery, s 5, 10 (1963). In other words, the term 
"unlawful" in the battery statute is the lynch pin that prevents "battery" from defining almost all 
touching that takes place in society, it is not simply a redundancy or a reference to some other 
statute outside the chapter. See Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 153 Idaho 468, 
472 (2012) (It is incumbent upon a court to give effect to all the words and provisions of the 
statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant). As Judge Burnett wrote in his 
special concurrence in State v. McDougall, 113 Idaho 900, 905-6 (1988): 
Such a distinction was recognized at common law. "The basic premise[,] that for 
criminal liability some mens rea is required[,] is expressed by the Latin maxim 
actus nonfacit reum nisi mens sit rea (an act does not make one guilty unless his 
mind is guilty)." Fn.l. With respect to crimes consisting of proscribed acts, mens 
rea traditionally has been thought to mean a criminal intent-that is, culpability 
grounded in a wrongful purpose. Criminal intent is more than the mere "intent" 
which denotes that an act is not accidental. 
FNl. The common law concept of mens rea has diminished application to 
statutory crimes which consist of negligence or of failure to perform affirmative 
duties. My focus here is on crimes consisting of proscribed acts. 
Despite its antiquity, mens rea is a seminal concept in modem criminal law. To 
illustrate, I.C. § 18-903(c) prohibits the "[a]ctual, intentional and unlawful 
touching or striking of another person against the will of the other .... " If a person 
suddenly pushes another away from an oncoming motor vehicle, the act is without 
contemporaneous consent and it is far from accidental. But there is no crime 
because the act is unaccompanied by a criminal intent. Similarly, if a person 
genuinely entertains the delusion that a motor vehicle is about to strike another, 
and he pushes the other out of the way, his act is intentional but he has committed 
no crime because, again, his intent was not criminal. 
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citing Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979); 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal 
Law 297 (1986). Similarly, at common law, the tort of battery requires an offensive or harmful 
contact without consent. See White v. University of Idaho, 119 Idaho 564,565 (1989). 
Further, the state dismisses Tomasini's actions as nonharmful by misconstruing the 
evidence. Tomasini admitted to placing a hand on the defendant's injured shoulder. Tr. p. 18, L. 
18 - p. 19, L. 2. The state therefore fails to argue on the basis of all the evidence presented to the 
Court as to whether the force used was reasonable. 
2. The state fails to adequately answer the question of whether self defense is 
allowed a trespasser facing even reasonable force in ejection. 
The state, in misconstruing the battery statute, fails to address whether a right to self 
defense exists for a trespasser. The relevant Idaho statutes LC.§§ 19-202A, 19-201, and 19-202 
provide no guidance. There is, at this point in time, no law that prevents a criminal from using 
self defense if they are being assaulted or battered. Further, even a person violating the law has a 
right to secure his safety. See IDAHO CONST. Art. I § 1. 
Even if this Court were to find that where a person recognizes their own conduct as 
criminal, they would not be allowed self defense against reasonable force, the Court must also 
find that where the defendant is unaware, their resistance would be as protected as that of the 
person using force against them. That was essentially the holding of the Supreme Court in 
Pettibone v. U.S., 148 U.S. 197 (1893). The Court held: 
[i]t seems clear that an indictment against a person for corruptly, or by threats or 
force, endeavoring to influence, intimidate, or impede a witness or officer in a 
court of the United States in the discharge of his duty, must charge knowledge or 
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notice, or set out facts that show knowledge or notice, on the part of the accused 
that the witness or officer was such; and the reason is no less strong for holding 
that a person is not sufficiently charged with obstructing or impeding the due 
administration of justice in a court unless it appears that he knew or had notice 
that justice was being administered in such court. Section 5399 is a reproduction 
of section 2 of the act of congress of March 2, 1831, c. 99, (4 St. p. 487,) 
'declaratory of the law concerning contempts of court,' though proceeding by 
indictment is not exclusive if the offense of obstructing justice be committed 
under such circumstances as to bring it within the power of the court, under 
section 725. In maters [sic] of contempt, persons are not held liable for the breach 
of a restraining order or injunction unless they know or have notice, or are 
chargeable with knowledge or notice, that the writ has been issued or the order 
entered, or at least that application is to be made; but without service of process, 
or knowledge or notice or information of the pendency of proceedings, a violation 
cannot be made out. 
Undoubtedly it is a condition of penal laws that ignorance of them constitutes no 
defense to an indictment for their violation, but that rule has no application here. 
The obstruction of the due adminstration [sic] of justice in any court of the United 
States, corruptly or by threats or force, is indeed made criminal, but such 
obstruction can only arise when justice is being administered. Unless that fact 
exists the statutory offense cannot be committed, and while, with knowledge or 
notice of that fact, the intent to offend accompanies obstructive action, without 
such knowledge or notice the evil intent is lacking. It is enough that the thing is 
done which the statute forbids, provided the situation invokes the protection of the 
law, and the accused is chargeable with knowledge or notice of the situation; but 
not otherwise. 
It is insisted, however, that the evil intent is to be found, not in the intent to 
violate the United States statute, but in the intent to commit an unlawful act, in the 
doing of which justice was in fact obstructed, and that, therefore, the intent to 
proceed in the obstruction of justice must be supplied by a fiction oflaw. But the 
specific intent to violate the statute must exist to justify a conviction, and, this 
being so, the doctrine that there may be a transfer of intent in regard to crimes 
flowing from general malevolence has no applicability. It is true that, if the act in 
question is a natural and probable consequence of an intended wrongful act, then 
the unintended wrong may derive its character from the wrong that was intended; 
but, if the unintended wrong was not a natural and probable consequence of the 
intended wrongful act, then this artificial character cannot be ascribed to it, as a 
basis of guilty intent. The element is wanting through which such quality might be 
imparted. 
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Id. at 206 citing Savin, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 267 (1889); Winslow v. Nayson, 113 Mass. 411 
(1873); 1 Bish. Crim. Law,§ 335; 2 Daniell, Ch. Pr. (4th Amer. Ed.) 1684; 2 High, Inj. (3d Ed.) 
§ § 1421, 1452. In sum, where the defendant would not reasonably have recognized the 
rightfulness of his attacker's actions, he cannot be proven guilty of violating the law when he 
defends himself. A contrary ruling puts citizens in an impossible position: on the one hand, the 
person physically attacking them may be in the right and so to respond in self defense will result 
in violating the law, on the other, the attacker may be in the wrong, or may be using excessive 
force, and therefore to do nothing would mean they must accept the attack. Such a ruling would 
effectively put an end to self defense in the state ofldaho. 
A better understanding of the law is that while a citizen may use reasonable force against 
a lawbreaker without himself breaking the law, that lawbreaker will be allowed to reasonably 
respond in kind without further violating the law, with the exception of dealings with the police. 
In a situation dealing with police officers, the presumption is that the officer's command is 
lawful. A similar presumption may arise for the burglar in a person's home. 
This case, however, is the antithesis of the above examples. The defendant is in a public 
place and is asked to leave by security guards he is arguing with. When he refuses, the guards 
take it upon themselves to physically eject him. The question for the trier then is whether a 
reasonable person would have recognized the guard's right to physically eject him under the 
circumstances, and further, whether what the guard did, by grabbing the defendant and placing a 
hand upon his injured shoulder, was a reasonable amount of force, and further, whether a person 
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might reasonably under the circumstances have worried that there was an imminent danger of 
bodily harm in excess of what was required. No rational trier of fact could find that the 
defendant was aware that he was violating the law when the security guard asked him to leave 
and he remained in the midst of a heated argument- the public is well aware that employees have 
supervisors, and that when a conflict occurs with the employee, one does not have to simply 
accept it. Further, no rational trier of fact would have thought that the much larger security 
guard, flanked by his fellow security guards, needed to cause the defendant pain by placing a 
hand on his injured shoulder. A rational trier of fact would recognize that in causing the 
defendant this unwarranted pain and suffering, the security guard in essence consents to 
receiving a kick to convince him to stop, and further, that the defendant had a right to stop the 
security guard from causing him such pain. 
DATED this __ 7 __ day of April, 2013. 
THE LAW OFFICE OF THE KOOTENAI 
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BY: ~ $qAeL 
1£¥ oris~ 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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